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How to Govern Behavioral Relationship in Megaprojects? Examining the Effect 1 
of Three Governance Mechanisms under Project Uncertainties 2 
Xian Zheng1, Yujie Lu2*, Ruidong Chang3 3 
Abstract: The relational behavior of project participants is crucial to the success of a 4 
megaproject. Although project governance has been widely studied with the aim of improving 5 
participants’ relational behavior, limited research examines the distinct effectiveness of various 6 
governance mechanisms on influencing relational behavior, especially in megaprojects. 7 
Through examining three varieties of governance mechanisms, including contract, trust and 8 
institutional support, a hierarchical moderated regression analysis has been used to explore the 9 
impact of each of the governance mechanisms in facilitating the relational behavior of 10 
megaproject participants and further team performance. The analysis is based on data collected 11 
from 202 contractors and consultants working at megaprojects in China. Results unveiled that 12 
both contractual term specificity and its interaction with trust can facilitate relational behavior. 13 
Project uncertainty moderates the relationship between governance mechanisms and relational 14 
behavior in affecting project team performance. The findings offer both theoretical and 15 
managerial implications for megaproject participants to cultivate beneficial relational behavior 16 
so as to improve team performance in megaprojects. 17 
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Megaprojects, Relational behavior, Trust 19 
INTRODUCTION  20 
Relational behavior has been receiving considerable attentions as one of the approaches to 21 
realize high-quality inter-organizational relationships in construction projects (Ning and Ling 22 
2014). Relational behavior refers to the desired actions involved in the exchange that promote 23 
the development of a collaborative relationship. Three most commonly observed relational 24 
behaviors are those pertaining to flexibility, information exchange and solidarity (Heide and 25 
John 1992; Hewett and Bearden 2001; Lusch and Brown 1996). Specifically, flexibility refers 26 
to the shared expectations between the partners regarding the way they will behave when 27 
unanticipated changes in the contractual environment occur; information exchange is the shared 28 
expectation that information will be continually and freely exchanged; and solidarity is defined 29 
as the shared expectation that each partner will behave in a manner that benefits the 30 
collaboration as a whole rather than simply protecting their own interests (Heide and John 1992). 31 
Such behaviors have been proved to be critical to foster and maintain a value-enhancing 32 
relationship among organizations and to enhance their performance (Griffith et al. 2006). This 33 
is especially true for successful megaprojects, such as the Thames Barrier and the Heysham 2 34 
Nuclear Power Station, in which project organizations tend to involve active relational behavior 35 
and high relationship quality between one another (Morris and Hough 1987). The reason is that 36 
megaprojects are expected to accomplish a challenging goal that cannot be completed by 37 
individual party alone, thereby calling for multiple stakeholders to conduct intensive relational 38 
behavior so as to achieve the success of projects (Zheng et al. 2017).  39 
Dyer and Singh (1998) pointed out that governance “plays a key role” in the creation of 40 
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inter-organizational relationship because it influences transaction costs and the willingness of 41 
partners to engage in value-creation initiatives. In the construction field, a project created by 42 
contracts could be regarded as a temporary coalition of firms working collectively with clients 43 
(Winch 1989). A project’s temporary, uniqueness, heterogeneous, short-term orientation and 44 
lack of organizational routines pose special challenges to stakeholders’ relationship 45 
management (Hanisch and Wald 2011). For instance, the collaboration in the coalition could be 46 
difficult (Phelps and Reddy 2009) and opportunism often occurs (Lau and Rowlinson 2009; Lu 47 
et al. 2016). Thus, effective governance that is able to develop a trustworthy relationship and 48 
implement relational behaviors among project participants is pivotal to the success of 49 
construction projects. 50 
The literature has suggested that two main types of governance are at play in an inter-51 
organizational relationship, namely contractual governance and relational governance (Heide 52 
1994; Jap and Anderson 2003; Poppo and Zenger 2002). Contractual governance refers to 53 
mechanisms that to govern interparty exchanges and to avoid uncertainties through 54 
emphasizing the importance of the contracts between transaction partners (Lumineau et al. 55 
2011). The role of contractual governance has been greatly emphasized by transaction cost 56 
economics in explicit terms and conditions (Cannon et al. 2000). Relational governance 57 
emphasizes inherent and moral control mechanisms, which are used to govern exchanges 58 
through consistent goals and a cooperative atmosphere (Lu et al. 2015). Relational governance 59 
such as trust is based on the relational exchange theory, which offers a less explicit set of terms 60 
to maintain a value-enhancing relationship (Macneil 1980).  61 
The effectiveness of contracts and trust in governing inter-organizational behavior and their 62 
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effects on cooperation performances have been widely studied (Luo 2002; Yang et al. 2011). In 63 
megaprojects, there are many endogenous factors driving relation conflicts such as ambiguous 64 
contracts, opportunistic behaviors, differences in goals and operational routines, and 65 
unexpected market changes (Jap and Ganesan 2000). Most importantly, megaprojects are large-66 
scale sociotechnical undertakings that cost over 1 Billion RMB (Chinese Currency) and that 67 
are complex and embedded in institutional frames (He et al. 2015). These project incorporated 68 
both traditional infrastructure such as transportation megaprojects but also large-scale public 69 
projects such as National Stadium for the 2008 Olympics and 2010 Shanghai World Expo 70 
projects, providing fundamental public services for economic development, social production, 71 
and people's life (Flyvbjerg 2011). Thus, Flyvbjerg (2014) argued that megaprojects are a 72 
completely different breed of projects and have to be managed differently from conventional 73 
projects. Prominent project management scholars have advocated that high attention needs to 74 
be paid to the institutional environment in which megaprojects are situated, especially in 75 
transition economies such as China (Chi et al. 2011), where the centralized political structure 76 
is implemented and dominated by the government both financially and administratively. The 77 
government who initiates a megaproject usually acts as both a regulator and a client. For 78 
instance, the government in China, as a regulator, often relied on administrative powers and 79 
means to govern megaprojects (Li et al. 2018). This is attributed to China’s institutional systems 80 
which are characterized by centralization governance and elitist governance. In addition, the 81 
client’s role of government is operationalized through the central role of the Construction 82 
Headquarters—a project-specific organization set up by the government for managing the 83 
megaproject (Zhai et al. 2017). Thus, in this study, the institutional support is regarded as a 84 
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governance mechanism to influence relational behavior in megaprojects. 85 
Given limited studies on the governance of relational behavior in megaprojects, three 86 
research gaps can be identified as follows. First, extant research regards the contract mechanism 87 
as an individual construct, but ignores different functions of the contract, e.g. specificity and 88 
adaptability, that might have a district effect on relational behaviors. Second, previous research 89 
primarily focuses on contractual governance and relationship governance, but seldom 90 
highlights the government’s institutional support to influence relational behavior in 91 
megaprojects. Third, limited research has focused on the megaproject’s uncertainties that 92 
influence the effect of governance mechanisms on relational behavior. To fill these gaps, this 93 
study empirically examines the effectiveness of various governance mechanisms on relational 94 
behavior among participating organizations under different levels of megaproject uncertainties 95 
in transition economies. 96 
Specifically, the three objectives of this study are: (1) to examine two different roles of 97 
contractual governance mechanisms (i.e. contractual term specificity and contractual 98 
contingency adaptability) on relational behavior in megaprojects; (2) to investigate the effect 99 
of trust and institutional support on relational behavior; and (3) to investigate the moderating 100 
effect of project uncertainty in influencing distinct governance mechanisms. These issues were 101 
examined using survey data from 202 contractors and consultants of megaprojects in China. 102 
The results could be helpful to strategize the relationship management and to further improve 103 
team performance. 104 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we proposed 105 
the research hypotheses, followed by the next section where the research method for data 106 
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collection and analysis is provided. We then discussed the findings and their managerial 107 
implications, and concluded the study with limitations and suggestions for future research. 108 
LITERATURE REVIEW 109 
Relational Behavior 110 
The concept of relational behavior is drawn from the relational exchange norms 111 
framework proposed by Macneil (1980) that identified 28 overlapping relational exchange 112 
norms, each of which refers to a set of shared expectations regarding a particular type of 113 
exchange behavior that reflects the parties’ mutuality of interests and a common long-term 114 
orientation (Sezen and Yilmaz 2007). This concept was developed further by Heide and John 115 
(1992), who proposed that the three most commonly observed relational behaviors are those 116 
pertaining to the norms of flexibility, information exchange, and solidarity. This conjecture has 117 
now been supported by a variety of reports in the literature (Hoppner and Griffith 2011; Ni et 118 
al. 2017) and was thus selected as the component of relational behavior for this study.  119 
The extant literature on relational behavior in the construction industry has, for the most 120 
part, concentrated on its drivers, hindrances, measure, and consequences (Memon 2014; Che et 121 
al. 2015). Regarding its drivers, the effectiveness of contracts and trust in governing inter-122 
organizational relationship and their effects on relational behavior have been studied 123 
respectively. For example, Ning et al. (2013) suggested that trust is among one of the most 124 
significant promoters of relational behavior, while Ke et al. (2013) examined the effects of 125 
various relational behaviors on relationship quality and project outcomes under different 126 
contract strategies. However, systematic analysis on the effect of governance mechanisms to 127 
relational behavior is scarce in the field of construction, especially in the context of the 128 
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megaproject.  129 
Compared with ordinary projects, both the frequency of interactions and the level of 130 
uncertainty are high in megaprojects from the perspective of transaction costs economics. 131 
Besides, the outcome of megaprojects is unpredictable, which indicate it is difficult to specify 132 
the contractual terms and clauses in advance (Park et al. 2017). These facts may mean that trust 133 
and the role of government are more important than contracts to facilitate relational behavior 134 
in megaprojects, especially in China — a country rich with guanxi. Li et al. (2018) highlighted 135 
that megaproject governance includes mandatory approaches such as formal policies, 136 
regulations, and programs, as well as informal project culture and relationship governance. 137 
Take World Explo 2010 in China as an example, the government support, such as the 138 
appointment of top management teams, the establishment of “project-oriented state-owned 139 
enterprises,” and the relations between government and private entities have great effect on the 140 
project performance. Therefore, it is essential to test the effect of various governance 141 
mechanisms on relational behavior in the context of megaproject settings. 142 
Governance Mechanisms in Megaprojects 143 
Governance mechanisms are safeguards that firms put in place to regulate inter-firm 144 
exchange, minimize exposure to opportunism, protect transaction cost investment, and promote 145 
the continuance of relationships (Jap and Ganesan 2000). It incorporates the formal and 146 
informal rules of exchange between partners, such as incentive structures, monitoring 147 
mechanisms, contractual provisions, reputations, norms, and trust (Jap and Anderson 2003). 148 
The literature has suggested that two main types of governance for inter-organizational 149 
relationships, namely the formal governance mechanism and informal governance mechanism 150 
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(Cao and Lumineau 2015). The theoretical category used in the main studies to summarize the 151 
interplay of formal and informal governance is demonstrated in Table 1.  152 
(Insert Table 1 here) 153 
As shown in Table 1, contractual governance and trust are two main types suggested by 154 
the previous literature. Contractual governance refers to the extent to which an inter-155 
organizational relationship is governed by a formal and written contract that explicitly stipulates 156 
the responsibilities and obligations of each party (Williamson 1985). By specifying each party’s 157 
rights and duties, contractual governance may reduce opportunism and safeguard an inter-158 
organizational relationship (Williamson 1985). Contractual governance plays an important role 159 
in reducing risks and facilitating coordination when megaproject participants conduct relational 160 
behavior (Malhotra and Lumineau 2011; Schepker et al. 2014). However, the majority of 161 
previous studies viewed contractual governance as an uni-dimensional construct (i.e., clause 162 
specificity), and caused a debate upon whether contracts should be more specific. Extended 163 
from this, contractual governance has been further defined as a two-dimensional construct that 164 
includes both the extent to which contractual terms are clearly specified (i.e., contractual term 165 
specificity), and the possible contingencies that a contract accounts for (i.e., contractual 166 
contingency adaptability) (Luo 2002). These two dimensions capture different aspects of 167 
contract completeness in which a transaction necessitates high contractual term specificity to 168 
restrain opportunism and also requires descriptions of contingencies that foster adaptation when 169 
unexpected events occur. Drawing on the multidimensional aspect of contracts, this study 170 
intended to investigate the effect of these two contract dimensions on relational behavior in 171 
megaprojects.  172 
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In addition to formal contracts, Trust is one of the most significant relational governance 173 
mechanisms which is proposed based on the relational exchange theory to maintain value-174 
enhancing relationship. A higher level of relational governance mechanism application in 175 
megaprojects indicates more informal interaction among stakeholders and less focus on formal 176 
contracts, thus contributing to organizational mutual adaptability and self-enforcing safeguard 177 
against conflicts and commitment-level relationship (Xue et al. 2016). Seen from Table 1, 178 
institutional support from the government has also been regarded as a significant relational 179 
mechanism in emerging economies like China (Chi et al. 2011). Institutional support is 180 
determined by the institutional environment of a country or a state. Emerging economies are 181 
commonly characterized by extensive government involvement and intervention in economic 182 
exchanges and market transactions (Davies and Walters 2004; Hellman and Schankerman 2000). 183 
Researchers have suggested the importance of aligning project governance with projects’ 184 
surrounding institutions to facilitate project success (Ahola et al. 2014). Institutional support 185 
from the central or local governments can support relational behavior among parties. Moreover, 186 
a bonding and commitment rested on a relationship can help overcome turbulences in the course 187 
of projects (Henisz et al. 2012). In a real-world situation, several safeguarding measures will 188 
be employed in combination. 189 
In addition to a contract as a frequently employed formal mechanism and trust being a 190 
typical informal mechanism, several other mechanisms, such as institutional support from the 191 
government are the third category. Those mechanisms can be categorized to either the formal 192 
or informal influence since in a megaproject, the government could act as both a regulator and 193 
a client to reflect both its administrative powers and informal actions. In this study, those 194 
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mechanisms are referred as institutional support (by the government) and it highlights the 195 
significant role of government in megaprojects. Thus, three main types of governance 196 
mechanisms for inter-organizational relationships, namely the contract, trust and institutional 197 
support, were identified to examine their effects on relational behavior in megaprojects. 198 
Although an increasing number of studies evaluated the effect of several safeguards to 199 
enhance relationship performance (Osipova 2015), few studies examined the dependent nature 200 
of contracts, trust, and institutional support on influencing relational behavior in the context of 201 
a megaproject which is situated in a wide socio-political environment and is subject to a high 202 
level of uncertainty. relationship performance (Osipova 2015), few studies examined the 203 
dependent nature of contracts, trust, and institutional support on relational behavior in the 204 
context of a megaproject which is often subject to the impacts of a wider socio-political 205 
environment and is subject to a high level of uncertainty. For collaboration among multiple 206 
megaproject participants, project uncertainty cannot be ignored as the effect of governance 207 
mechanisms on participants’ relational behavior may vary under various levels of project 208 
uncertainty. Consequently, there is a need for empirical research to determine the effect of the 209 
simultaneous use of multiple governance mechanisms on relational behavior under different 210 
megaproject context. 211 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 212 
Governance Mechanisms and Relational Behavior 213 
As one of the main component of contractual governance mechanism, contractual term 214 
specificity refers to the extent to which contractual terms are clearly specified. It may reinforce 215 
the relational behavior of megaproject participants through three mechanisms. First, Myers 216 
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(2007) suggested that contractual term specificity protects a partner’s strategic resources and 217 
reduces operational and financial uncertainties by controlling opportunism and spurring 218 
information flow. Using appropriate contractual safeguards to reduce opportunism and preserve 219 
relationships is of paramount importance in megaprojects that typically involve long duration 220 
and the commitment of idiosyncratic assets (Ke et al. 2013). Thus, both decreased opportunism 221 
and increased relationship are beneficial for cultivating the relational behavior of megaproject 222 
participants. Second, contractual specificity can help project participants to exchange their 223 
understanding, expectations, and respective roles in the transaction (Beatty and Samuelson 224 
1990) and to mitigate the risk of misunderstandings that will disrupt collaboration among 225 
(presumably) well-intentioned parties (Malhotra and Lumineau 2011). Thus, specific contracts 226 
could facilitate the formation of relational behavior among participants with reduced risks, 227 
potential conflicts and disputes (Zhang et al. 2016). Third, when clients explicitly specify the 228 
performance outcome, they expect the service supplier to deliver (Das and Teng 2001; 229 
Eisenhardt 1985). It aligns with the preferences and goals of all contracting parties. With a 230 
substantial reduction in incongruent self-interests, contractual term specificity may further 231 
enhance participants’ relational behavior. 232 
Contractual contingency adaptability is the extent to which unanticipated contingencies 233 
are accounted for and relevant guidelines that are delineated in a contract for handling these 234 
contingencies (Luo 2002). It stipulates principles, guidelines, and possible solutions for dealing 235 
with conflicts and contingencies, outlining a mutually agreed tolerance zone or excuse doctrine 236 
for dealing with unexpected events. In practice, these guidelines or possible solutions are 237 
incorporated in a contract as independent terms (e.g., procedures for handling important 238 
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contingencies, guidelines in case of doubt or hazards, approaches for overcoming conflict and 239 
handling force majeure) or as a part of relevant clauses in specific cases (e.g., how to handle 240 
unanticipated changes in the market or governmental policies). With contractual contingency 241 
adaptability, a contract is expected to foster flexibility by furnishing customized approaches 242 
and contingency procedures for dealing with future contingencies, especially in megaprojects 243 
with great uncertainties, as contracting parties know that the contract is not perfectly rigid and 244 
will evolve as needs change, calling for the processes that can accommodate such changes. For 245 
instance, a demand forecast plan or business continuity plan may contain provisions that entail 246 
contingency plans for the relationship. These provisions reflect the joint expectation that 247 
megaproject participants are willing to make necessary adaptations to the contract as business 248 
and environmental circumstances change (Dwyer et al. 1987). Contractual contingency 249 
adaptability is important and especially conducive to promote inter-organizational relational 250 
behavior (Doz 1996) when a conflict arises. Otherwise, disputing participants are unlikely to 251 
further engage in effective communication (Hinds and Mortensen 2005). Therefore, this study 252 
proposes the following two hypotheses firstly: 253 
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Contractual term specificity in a contract has a positive effect on the 254 
relational behavior of megaproject participants. 255 
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Contractual contingency adaptability in a contract has a positive 256 
effect on the relational behavior of megaproject participants. 257 
Rather than contractual governance that relies on formal agreements with third-party 258 
enforcement, relational governance relies on informal structure and self-enforcement by each 259 
party (Dyer and Singh 1998; Malhotra and Murnighan 2002). In the existing literature, trust is 260 
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one of the most frequently discussed forms of relational governance (Griffith and Myers 2005). 261 
In relational exchange theory, trust relates positively to relational behavior because confidence 262 
in and reliance on the other partners promote their mutual flexibility, solidarity, and information 263 
exchange (Lui et al. 2009). Poppo and Zenger (2002) proposed that trust not only enhances 264 
mutual adaptability and facilitates joint planning (Claro et al. 2003) but also contributes to a 265 
commitment-level relationship that operates as a self-enforcing safeguard against conflicts 266 
(Malhotra and Lumineau 2011).  267 
In megaprojects where many conflicts, differences, disputes, and other undesirable 268 
behaviors exist with a high level of trust, participants reduce the cost of monitoring, controlling, 269 
and enforcing (Goo et al. 2009) and increase the possibility to attain mutually beneficial 270 
agreements (Khalfan et al. 2007), eventually improving project performance (Jiang et al. 2016; 271 
Meng 2012). Pinto et al. (2009) found that trust helps to strengthen cooperation, which, in turn, 272 
benefits the project as a whole.  273 
In China, the role of trust may be even more salient (Möller and Svahn 2004). The lack of 274 
a robust regulatory institution compels firms to rely more on social connections and trust to 275 
obtain needed resources and protection (Jiang and Lu 2017; Memon et al. 2014). Business 276 
conducted in China also has the tradition of heavily relying on informal ties with trustworthy 277 
partners. As Xin and Pearce (1996) pointed out, trust and credibility are more instrumental than 278 
a legal framework in guiding business cooperation in China. Chinese project managers prefer 279 
to develop and maintain a good, even personal, relationship with their clients (Chen and 280 
Partington 2004), which is an essential attribute of good project management. As a result, good 281 
relationships with all involved parties are vital for resolving conflicts, facilitating 282 
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communication, and sharing knowledge (Rahman and Alhassan 2012). Thus, the following 283 
hypothesis was proposed: 284 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Trust has a positive effect on the relational behavior of megaproject 285 
participants. 286 
Institutional support from the central or local government is another governance 287 
mechanism that incorporates the availability of valuable industry information, subsidies, tax 288 
reductions, and regulatory favors (Pistor et al. 2000). Due to these potential benefits, 289 
megaproject participants would seek increased political networking with the government to 290 
build a close relationship in the expectation of higher chances to win future contracts. Chi and 291 
Javernick‐Will (2011) proposed that political networking generates greater value when 292 
located in certain strategic or hierarchical positions where useful information about 293 
opportunities is available, with power derived from decision-making authority or access to 294 
valued resources. In megaprojects, the government can also be understood as an intermediary 295 
that combines its own legal stake and society’s moral stake (Sallinen et al. 2013). The 296 
government was actively promoting a shared view of the societal importance of the megaproject 297 
to affirm the commitment of megaproject participants, thus facilitating their relational behavior. 298 
In China, the use of this governance approach has earlier been demonstrated with linkage to 299 
relational norms of national glory and individual values (Chi et al. 2011), and with the potential 300 
to promote relational behavior among megaproject participants. The following hypothesis was 301 
proposed: 302 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Institutional support has a positive effect on the relational behavior of 303 
megaproject participants.  304 
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Interaction of Governance Mechanisms 305 
As to the relationship between contractual and relational governance, two viewpoints arise 306 
in the existing literature. Some scholars suggested that these two governance mechanisms can 307 
complement each other’s inadequacies and limitations in achieving higher exchange 308 
performance and in constraining opportunism (Lui et al. 2009; Poppo and Zenger 2002). 309 
However, others have viewed the relational mechanism as a substitute for a complex and 310 
explicit contract (Cao and Lumineau 2015). Recent studies have provided more nuanced 311 
explanations of the mutual relationship between contractual and relational governance. They 312 
argued that both complementary and substitute propositions are possible, depending on the 313 
contents and functions of contracts as well as contextual factors (Hinds and Mortensen 2005). 314 
In particular, recent works indicate that multiple dimensions of contractual governance may 315 
have different impacts on relational governance (Malhotra and Lumineau 2011; Schepker et al. 316 
2014). 317 
In terms of contractual term specificity, regardless of how explicit a contract is, the 318 
interpretation and application of contracts may be different between cooperative parties. Some 319 
firms use contractual terms rigidly while other firms use the terms in a more flexible way. 320 
Different applications may generate conflicts and degrade cooperation. As such, project 321 
participants may turn to a relational mechanism such as trust (Williamson 1985) because the 322 
continuity and cooperation encouraged by relational mechanisms may generate contractual 323 
refinements and further support greater collaboration (Poppo and Zenger 2002). Trust is broadly 324 
considered as being flexible and adaptable, so it can overcome the adaptive limits of contractual 325 
term specificity and complement it by fostering continuance and bilateralism when change and 326 
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conflict arise. From another perspective, trust is difficult to be formally codified as ambiguous 327 
expectations and misunderstandings will arise, which undermines coordination and even results 328 
in opportunism (Weitz and Jap 1995). Overcoming the informal limitations of trust, contractual 329 
term specificity can complement it through formal clauses that help establish a solid basis for 330 
the development of trust. Therefore, term specificity can provide a formal framework for a 331 
megaproject and trust can eliminate contract limitations; that is, they function as mutual 332 
complements instead of substitutes. Jointly using these two mechanisms can potentially 333 
improve relational behavior more than using them separately (Liu et al. 2009).  334 
Regarding contractual contingency adaptability, due to humans’ natural bounded 335 
rationality, it is impossible to write a complete contract that anticipates all possible 336 
contingencies and clarifies the appropriate actions of each party (Wuyts and Geyskens 2005). 337 
Project managers cannot predict and contractually resolve every future contingency and, 338 
therefore, request an “incomplete” contract that is less legally binding as it contains fewer 339 
clauses and/or the clauses are neither observable nor verifiable (Dooley and Ven 1999). 340 
However, a lack of specific clauses may also introduce ambiguity and leave space for 341 
opportunistic behavior (Luo 2002). Furthermore, a higher level of contractual contingency 342 
adaptability may signal a lack of trust, which may be detrimental for the cooperative inter-343 
organizational relationship (Poppo and Zenger 2002). The following hypotheses were therefore 344 
proposed: 345 
Hypothesis 4a (H4a). Contractual term specificity and trust are complementary in 346 
promoting the relational behavior of megaproject participants. 347 
Hypothesis 4b (H4b). Contractual contingency adaptability and trust are substitutes in 348 
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promoting the relational behavior of megaproject participants. 349 
Moderating Effect of Project Uncertainty  350 
Project uncertainty refers to the frequency of changes and the degree of instability during 351 
the project lifecycle (Wang et al. 2011). Pertinent studies suggest three main sources of project 352 
uncertainty in a megaproject: task uncertainty, technological novelty, and environmental 353 
uncertainty (Yan and Dooley 2013). Task uncertainty arises from a large number of components 354 
and/or a high level of differentiation and interdependencies between them (Dooley and Ven 355 
1999). High task uncertainty causes equivocality and multiple or conflicting interpretations of 356 
task situations (Koufteros et al. 2002). High uncertainty also requires highly differentiated 357 
expertise, making the integration of knowledge and skills very difficult. During the 358 
development of a megaproject, the complex interdependences among components make it 359 
challenging to predict and understand the impacts of distributed decisions on the overall task 360 
performance. As a result, megaprojects often take a longer time to complete. In addition, 361 
technological novelty is another source of megaproject uncertainty, and it varies at different 362 
levels (Tatikonda and Montoya-Weiss 2001). Novel technologies refer to those that are new to 363 
be used by the participating organizations. At the beginning of a megaproject, when novel 364 
technologies are initially adopted, project members may not fully understand the technology 365 
well neither knowing the appropriate means nor even the consequences of using such 366 
technology. Such unfamiliarity leads to high degree of uncertainty about accomplishing project 367 
development tasks. Empirical studies have found that megaprojects using novel technology are 368 
often less likely to succeed due to their higher level of uncertainty (Tatikonda and Rosenthal 369 
2000). The last source of uncertainty originates from the project’s environmental and contextual 370 
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factors, and that may preclude the effective use of mechanisms to safeguard and enforce a 371 
business relationship (Anderson and Weitz 1989). Environmental uncertainty refers to the rate 372 
of change and the degree of unpredictability in the environment and generated by resource 373 
scarcity and by a lack of perfect knowledge about environmental fluctuations (Dess and Beard 374 
1984). Such environmental uncertainty may lead to information asymmetry among parties and 375 
enable participating organizations to behave opportunistically.  376 
The optimal response to uncertainty, based on neoclassical contract theory, is to rely on 377 
the safeguard of a contract (Carson et al. 2006). Megaproject participants may seek to tie down 378 
terms and definitions as a way to remove uncertainties, particularly ambiguity, from a contract. 379 
A specified contract along these lines is one approach to remedy the problems of volatility and 380 
ambiguity. In megaprojects, firms often enter into exceptionally complex contracts to deal with 381 
uncertain contracting situations. The more complex and complete a contract the less flexible 382 
and adaptable it is. Such inflexible contracts create challenges to contractual governance. Ex 383 
post adjustments in megaprojects become problematic when all parties need to renegotiate to 384 
accommodate changes, substantially weakening or eliminating the contract safeguard 385 
capabilities for megaproject participants in conducting relational behavior. Therefore, this study 386 
proposes: 387 
Hypothesis 5a (H5a):  The higher the project uncertainty, the weaker the positive 388 
relationship between contractual term specificity and megaproject participants’ relational 389 
behavior. 390 
Another main challenge of project uncertainty is the difficulty in obtaining useful 391 
information (Molm et al. 2009) as information asymmetries place a premium on opportunism 392 
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(Williamson 1985). From a review of opportunism in exchange relationships, Crosno and 393 
Dahlstrom (2008) found that external uncertainty would increase opportunism by increasing 394 
the likelihood that participants would shirk responsibilities and break the agreements to seek 395 
their own interests (Katsikeas et al. 2009). Under such circumstance, the increased opportunism 396 
dampens inter-organizational commitment, resulting in less relational behavior. Clauses for 397 
contractual contingency adaptability are devised to address different environmental scenarios, 398 
especially unpredicted environmental changes. With adaptable approaches and contingency 399 
procedures for dealing with such inevitable changes, megaproject participants could deal with 400 
uncertainties in a flexible way to decrease conflicts, contributing to the more relational behavior. 401 
Therefore, this study proposes: 402 
Hypothesis 5b (H5b): The higher the project uncertainty, the stronger the positive 403 
relationship between contractual contingency adaptability and megaproject participants’ 404 
relational behavior. 405 
In contrast, trust may overcome the inflexibility disadvantages of contractually-based 406 
governance in a turbulent environment. Trust provides the flexibility to cope with inevitable 407 
uncertainties that arise in a long-term exchange. Such flexibility helps mitigate exchange 408 
hazards under uncertainties and strengthens bilateral commitment to exchange-specific 409 
investments (Luo 2002). Thus, flexibility enables firms to adapt to unforeseeable technological 410 
and market changes. High uncertainty, especially in transition economies like China (Zhou et 411 
al. 2003), is likely to reinforce the cultivation of trust between contracting partners. From 412 
another perspective, trust is supposed to absorb the environmental uncertainty through joint 413 
planning and problem solving (Nyaga et al. 2010). Megaproject participants may employ trust 414 
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to manage an environment that is more turbulent than each can cope with alone (Morgan and 415 
Hunt 1994). The following hypotheses were therefore proposed: 416 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): The higher the project uncertainty, the stronger the positive 417 
relationship between trust and megaproject participants’ relational behavior. 418 
Relational Behavior and Team Performance 419 
Pertinent studies have proposed a positive relationship between inter-firm relational 420 
behavior and performance in a supply chain. For example, particularly cooperative behavior, 421 
such as flexibility, shared problem-solving, voluntary information exchange, and restraint in 422 
the use of power, can improve the performance of a supply chain (Singh and Teng 2016; 423 
Koolwijk et al. 2018). Johnston et al. (2004) found that increased cooperative behavior 424 
contributes to higher perceived performance and satisfaction among the buyer firms. Research 425 
also shows that partners who share critical, accurate, and sensitive information in a timely 426 
manner are more successful than those do not exhibit relational behaviors (Chen et al. 2004). 427 
Although relational behavior may increase the integrated value of megaprojects, the 428 
sustainability of such behavior depends on how much of the value is captured by each 429 
participating organization (Bowman and Ambrosini 2000). Paulraj et al. (2008) pointed out that 430 
through effective and efficient information sharing between participating organizations, 431 
performance-related errors can be reduced and, task efficiency and stakeholder satisfaction of 432 
individual team can be improved. Especially, when sharing important information regarding 433 
megaproject design issues and materials procurement, participating organizations are more 434 
likely (1) to improve the quality of the megaproject (Carr and Kaynak 2007), (2) to reduce 435 
response time, (3) to reduce the costs of protecting against opportunistic behavior, and (4) to 436 
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increase cost savings through operational efficiencies (Carr and Pearson 1999). Moreover, 437 
relational behavior also enables participating organizations to make dependable delivery, hence 438 
leading to a high level of project integration and positively contributing to obtaining the loyalty 439 
of project participants. 440 
A high degree of solidarity of participants’ relational behavior, such as joint planning and 441 
joint problem solving, is expected to contribute to a high level of perceived satisfaction and 442 
team performance. For instance, joint planning could facilitate the efficiency of business 443 
transactions between megaproject participants and improve a team’s time performance by 444 
reducing the risk of unexpected problems and a sophisticated negotiation process. As for joint 445 
problem solving, it allows for creative forms of dealing with disagreements and other 446 
contingencies of business relationships, contributing to the reduction of transaction costs and 447 
improving the cost performance of individual teams. Besides, joint problem solving could 448 
promote knowledge transfer between contracting parties by allowing parties to learn from each 449 
other through experience, observation, and/or demonstration (Cai et al. 2009), resulting in the 450 
higher task efficiency of an individual team. Finally, megaproject participating organizations 451 
closely engaging in the current project could build strong social relations for future business 452 
collaboration (Lu and Yan 2007). Thus, it is hypothesized that: 453 
Hypothesis 7 (H7). The relational behavior of megaproject participants has a positive 454 
effect on their team performance. 455 
After consolidating all hypotheses into a framework, the conceptual model can be 456 
established and shown in Fig. 1.  457 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 458 
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RESEARCH METHOD 459 
To test the research model and hypotheses, a questionnaire survey was developed based 460 
on literature review, refined through a pilot study, and subsequently used for the data collection 461 
and analysis. 462 
Measurements 463 
The development of measurement began with an investigation of the theoretical and 464 
empirical literature on inter-organizational relationship governance. Then the identified 465 
measurement items used for the constructs were modified based on the context of megaprojects. 466 
Specifically, the measures of contractual governance mechanisms concentrated on the 467 
contractual term specificity and contractual contingency adaptability in megaprojects, which 468 
were reflective constructs composed of three items and two items, respectively, based on the 469 
measures reported in the studies of Jap and Ganesan (2000), Goo et al. (2009) and, Luo (2002). 470 
Trust that reflects the confidence of participating organizations in others’ reliability and 471 
integrity was also a reflective construct measured by five items referring to the study of Lu et 472 
al. (2015). To measure institutional support, two reflective items were used to assess the 473 
government's support for and protection of megaprojects (Li and Atuahene-Gima 2001). 474 
Consistent with the literature of Hoppner and Griffith (2011), relational behavior was 475 
operationalized as a second-order reflective construct composed of three sub-constructs: 476 
solidarity, flexibility, and information sharing. Project uncertainty was captured by three items 477 
describing change and instability of the external environment, technology, and task during a 478 
megaproject’s lifecycle (Yan and Dooley 2013). Based on the work of Lu et al. (2015) and 479 
interviews with field practitioners, team performance was operationalized as a reflective construct 480 
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of five items, tapping the dimensions of (a) time performance, (b) quality performance, (c) cost 481 
performance, (d) building long-term partnerships, and (e) collaborating joint projects in the 482 
future. Table 2 presents all constructs, along with their measurement items. 483 
(Insert Table 2 here) 484 
The model also incorporates three control variables that have been suggested by previous 485 
studies to have a potential influence on relational behavior, namely prior collaborative 486 
experience with other participating organizations (“prior collaborative experience”), project 487 
duration, and project delivery method. Relational behavior may be influenced by the historical 488 
interactions among participating organizations as prior experience determines their familiarity 489 
and trust development (Buvik and Rolfsen 2015; Zhang et al. 2009). In terms of project duration, 490 
a longer duration is generally expected to cultivate the development of a high-quality 491 
relationship (Levinthal and Fichman 1988), thus, in turn, facilitating relational behavior. 492 
Previous research also suggested that project performance varies under different project 493 
delivery methods (Ling et al. 2004), such as design–bid–build (DBB), design-build (DB), and 494 
EPC, as each delivery method indicates distinct organizational behaviors and team 495 
collaboration. Regarding measurement, megaproject duration was scaled with a dummy 496 
variable: duration less than 3 years (= 1) and above 3 years (= 2). Project delivery method was 497 
treated as a categorical variable, including DBB, EPC, DB, and other methods. The prior 498 
collaborative experience was measured by asking respondents whether they had historical 499 
cooperative experience with contracting partners based on a dichotomy variable (0 = without 500 
prior collaborative experience, 1 = with prior collaborative experience). 501 
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Sampling and Data Collection 502 
Based on a comprehensive literature review, we developed a pilot survey questionnaire 503 
that was evaluated by 26 experienced practitioners: 6 clients, 9 contractors and 11 consultants. 504 
By considering the feedback and comments provided, we evaluated the content validity of the 505 
items and tested measurement purification prior to the finalization of the questionnaire and the 506 
execution of the survey. After removing one inappropriate item, splitting one item into two, 507 
and rephrasing items that were not explicitly described, we present the final version of the 508 
measurement items in Appendix S1 in the Supplemental Data.  509 
The governance mechanisms are primarily designed and reinforced by megaproject clients 510 
(including governmental officials involved as clients) to manage inter-organizational 511 
relationships effectively, especially between them and service providers (refer to as 512 
“consultants” and “contractors”). Thus, we selected the consultants and contractors as “key 513 
informants” for data collection to investigate the effectiveness of various governance 514 
mechanisms on their relational behavior. The use of key informants of one contracting party as 515 
data sources to understand the inter-organizational relationship has been widely adopted in past 516 
studies (Goo et al. 2009; Paulraj et al. 2008; Shiu et al. 2014). Ning and Ling (2013) emphasized 517 
that the consultants’ and contractors’ behavior is of great importance to high-quality inter-518 
organizational relationships though they are reluctant to conduct relational behavior. In the 519 
survey, key informants are primarily referred to as project managers who were intimately 520 
involved with megaproject governance and have abundant knowledge about inter-521 
organizational relationships.  522 
Large companies that often participate in megaprojects were approached to complete the 523 
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questionnaire, including China Railway Group, China State Construction Company, Shanghai 524 
Construction Group Company, Tongji Architectural Design Group, CCDI Group, and Shanghai 525 
Hua Dong Engineering Corporation. These companies are all listed among the Top 20 in the 526 
2015 ENR Top Chinese Contractors and 2015 ENR Top Chinese Design Firms. Two criteria 527 
were adopted to identify qualified participants in the above companies, namely, those who have 528 
worked or are working on projects costing over 1 Billion RMB (Chinese Currency) (He et al. 529 
2015) and those holding senior-level positions in their firm such as directors or managers. To 530 
maximize the number of qualified respondents, a snowball sampling technique was used; that 531 
is, all respondents to the survey were asked to refer other eligible individuals who might be 532 
interested in participating. 533 
The survey was completed between January and July 2016. A total of 238 responses were 534 
collected from the 737 questionnaires distributed among potential project consultants and 535 
contractors (32.3% response rate). We then cleaned the raw data by deleting incomplete 536 
questionnaires. The final sample consists of 202 responses, in which 42.6%, 37.1%, and 20.3% 537 
were collected on the spot, via an online survey, and by email, respectively. The answers from 538 
the three types of collection were compared through one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), 539 
revealing no significant differences at the significance level of 0.05 among them. Hence, the 540 
data from all three sources were used for the analysis without distinction.  541 
Among all megaprojects indicated by respondents, 84.2% cost 1–5 billion RMB and 15.8% 542 
cost over 5 billion RMB. Regarding project duration, 46.5% were completed in 2–3 years and 543 
53.5% were completed longer than three years. Furthermore, 71.8% of the projects were public 544 
and 28.2% were private projects. A majority of the megaprojects (86.1%) adopted design–bid–545 
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build (DBB) as the delivery method while the remaining 13.9% employed other methods, such 546 
as engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC), and design-build (DB). The rest of the 547 
characteristics for these megaprojects and the survey respondents are shown in Table 3. 548 
(Insert Table 3 here) 549 
To further validate the data quality and address two common issues concerning survey 550 
methodology, i.e., non-response bias and common method variance (Podsakoff et al. 2003), a 551 
series of additional tests have been performed. Non-response bias was evaluated by testing 552 
significant differences between the responses of the first 30 received surveys and that of the 553 
last 30 received surveys (Armstrong and Overton 1977). In this survey, both T-test and ANOVA 554 
results revealed that no significant differences existed. The possibility of common method 555 
variance for all variables was then examined via Harman’s one-factor test because respondents 556 
were requested to answer questions on both the dependent and independent variables 557 
(Podsakoff et al. 2003). The result satisfied the required threshold (26.53% < 50%) regarding 558 
the ratio of the first factor accounting for the overall variance. 559 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 560 
To validate the proposed hypotheses, two steps were conducted. First, we estimated the 561 
model’s reliability and validity by using partial least square structural equation modeling (PLS-562 
SEM) and confirmatory factor analysis. Second, we tested the theoretical model with 563 
hierarchical moderated regression analyses. 564 
In the first step, the validity of all constructs, including their internal consistency, indicator 565 
reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity, were assessed (Hair et al. 2011; Le et 566 
al. 2014), with the results presented in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 displays the descriptive statistics 567 
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and correlations for each construct and Table 5 shows that the composite reliability (CR) of 568 
each construct was validated (CR > 0.70) and the results satisfied the requirement of internal 569 
consistency (Hair et al. 2014). The indicator reliability was also assessed by examining the 570 
loadings of the multiple items on their corresponding constructs, showing that all factor 571 
loadings were statistically significant (p < 0.001). The result that average variance extracted 572 
(AVE) of all constructs were greater than 0.50 showed that each item is strongly related to its 573 
latent construct, in support of convergent validity. The discriminant validity used to reflect the 574 
difference between two latent constructs is confirmed in both Table S1 of Appendix S2 and 575 
Table S2 in the Supplemental Data. 576 
Regarding the second-order construct — relational behavior, we evaluated the reliability 577 
and validity as well. Firstly, all the outer loadings of eight measurements are well above the 578 
critical value of 0.70. Specifically, the relational behavior's composite reliability (0.84) is 579 
greater than the critical value of 0.70, thus supporting internal consistency reliability. The AVE 580 
of relational behavior has a value of 0.51, also providing evidence of convergent validity. 581 
Furthermore, based on the result of correlations of variables in Table 4, the square root of the 582 
AVE for relational behavior in the diagonal was greater than its highest off-diagonal value (Hair 583 
et al. 2014), providing evidence of discriminant validity among the theoretical constructs. 584 
Finally, it is verified that the relational behavior has strong relationships with its first-order 585 
constructs — solidarity (0.73), flexibility (0.66) and information sharing (0.82). Hence, all first-586 
order constructs are sufficiently highly correlated for their second-order construct (i.e., 587 
relational behavior) with high level of explanation for more than 50% of each first-order 588 
construct's variance. 589 
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(Insert Table 4 here) 590 
 (Insert Table 5 here) 591 
In the second step, because the proposed model contains interaction terms between 592 
governance mechanisms and project uncertainty, hierarchical moderated regression analysis 593 
was used for validation (Liu et al. 2009) and the results are presented in Table 6. The baseline 594 
model (Model 1 in Table 6) contains control variables as the only inputs. The results revealed 595 
that control variables were not significantly related to relational behavior, as they accounted for 596 
only 1% of the variance in relational behavior. Model 2 adds three kinds of governance 597 
mechanisms — contractual term specificity (X1), contractual contingency adaptability (X2), 598 
trust (X3), institutional support (X4) and the moderator — project uncertainty (X5), resulting 599 
in increasing the predictive power (∆R² = 0.32, F = 11.95, p < 0.001) in explaining the variance 600 
of relational behavior. Model 3 features all the interactive effects between governance 601 
mechanisms and project uncertainty on relational behavior. Prior to the creation of the 602 
interaction terms in Model 3, the independent variables were centered to reduce 603 
multicollinearity (Aiken and West, 1991) and the variance inflation factors (VIF) was calculated 604 
for every regression equation. The result indicates that the maximum VIF of the model (3.50) 605 
meets the requirement of VIF < 10 (Nachtsheim and Chris 2004). The addition of the interaction 606 
terms in Model 3 further increased the R-square value than Model 2 (∆R² = 0.05, F = 8.99, p 607 
<0.01), in support of the significant moderating effects of project uncertainty. Finally, we 608 
assessed the effect of relational behavior on team performance in Model 4, in which the 609 
explained variance was significant (R² = 0.32, F = 93.54, p < 0.001). 610 
This material may be downloaded for personal use only. Any other use requires prior permission of the American Society of Civil Engineers 
 
29 
 
 
Main Effect 611 
The results in Model 3, demonstrate that term specificity had a significant, positive effect 612 
on relational behavior (β = 0.23, p < 0.01), providing support for H1a, whereas contractual 613 
contingency adaptability was found to have no significant effect on influencing relational 614 
behavior (β = −0.01, n.s.), not in support of H1b. These results corroborate previous 615 
recommendations to distinguish contractual term specificity and contingency adaptability and 616 
to examine their differential impacts (Luo 2002). The results also suggest that trust (β = 0.29, 617 
p < 0.001) was positively related to relational behavior, in support of H2, and institutional 618 
support significantly increased relational behavior in megaprojects (β = 0.19, p < 0.001), in 619 
support of H3, revealing the necessity to take institutional support into account. H7, which 620 
predicted that relational behavior was positively related to team performance of participating 621 
organizations, was also supported (β = 0.57, p < 0.001). However, the main effect of project 622 
uncertainty slightly facilitates relational behavior of megaproject participants, though not 623 
significantly (β = 0.04, n.s.).  624 
Moderating Effect 625 
By examining the path coefficients of the interaction variable on relational behavior, we 626 
suggest that contractual term specificity and trust increase relational behavior complementarily 627 
in megaprojects (β = 0.57, p < 0.001), supporting H4a. In contrast, contractual contingency 628 
adaptability and trust are neither pure substitutes nor complements (Model 3: β = −0.09, n.s.). 629 
Thus, our results do not support H4b. 630 
H5a and H5b predicted the moderating influence of project uncertainty on the relationship 631 
between contractual governance and relational behavior. Seen from Model 3, the coefficient of 632 
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contractual governance multiplied by project uncertainty is negative and significant (β = −0.35, 633 
p < 0.001). Thus, project uncertainty negatively moderates the relationship, and H5a is 634 
supported. Meanwhile, the coefficient of contractual contingency adaptability is positive and 635 
significant in Model 3 (β = 0.18, p < 0.1), thus H5b is also supported. Regarding the interplay 636 
of trust and project uncertainty, in line with our prediction, the results indicate that project 637 
uncertainty positively moderates the relationship between trust and relational behavior (β = 638 
0.13, p < 0.1), in support of H6.  639 
To further interpret these moderating effects, the respective effects of contract and trust on 640 
relational behavior for low and high levels of project uncertainty are plotted in Fig. 2. The 641 
calculation of the simple slopes and their significance levels was based on Aiken et al. (1991) 642 
approach. Fig. 2(a) reveals that the sloped regression line for the relationship between 643 
contractual term specificity and participating organizations’ relational behavior was negative 644 
and not significant for high project uncertainty (β = −0.08, n.s.), but was positive and significant 645 
for low project uncertainty (β = 0.54, p < 0.001 ), in support of H5a of the negative moderating 646 
effect. In contrast, the positive moderating effect of project uncertainty was confirmed in both 647 
Figs. 2(b) and 2(c). In Fig. 2(b), project uncertainty strengthened the effect of contractual 648 
contingency adaptability on participating organizations’ relational behavior, though the 649 
relationships between them were both nonsignificant (β = −0.16) for low project uncertainty 650 
and β = 0.14 for high project uncertainty. Similarly, in Fig. 2 (c), trust had a minor positive 651 
effect on participating organizations’ relational behavior when comparing high project 652 
uncertainty (β = 0.42, p < 0.001) to low uncertainty (β = 0.16, n.s.), in line with H6. 653 
(Insert Table 6 here) 654 
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(Insert Figure 2 here) 655 
DISCUSSION AND VALIDATION 656 
By examining the impact of three distinctive governance mechanisms that link 657 
participating organizations’ relational behavior to their performance outcomes, this study 658 
provides significant evidences to support the hypotheses H1a, H2 and H3 by confirming the 659 
determinants of contractual term specificity, trust and institutional support in promoting 660 
relational behavior, which in turn facilitates team performance of megaproject participants (H7). 661 
In addition, it is worth noting that the findings of this study favored a differentiated result for 662 
contractual term specificity (H5a) and contractual contingency adaptability (H5b) when the 663 
respective effects on participants’ relational behavior are moderated by different levels of 664 
project uncertainty, supporting H5a but not supporting H5b. 665 
The Effect of Governance Mechanisms on Relational Behavior 666 
Among various forms of governance mechanisms, including contractual term specificity, 667 
trust, and institutional support, trust acts as the most effective driver to positively impact project 668 
participants’ relational behavior, particularly the contract mechanism. This result is similar to 669 
pertinent studies in other fields. For example, Wu et al. (2017b) demonstrated that trust is more 670 
important than contracts for the performance of cooperative innovation projects in high-tech 671 
enterprises. Trust grants information sharing to access the valuable knowledge of project 672 
participants, and facilitates the acquisition of novel ideas and insights that lay the groundwork 673 
for problem-solving. This is true for both innovation-driven enterprises and megaprojects that 674 
demand massive, accurate, and quickly-responding information from various suppliers, and in 675 
which the cooperation process among participants is complex. Therefore, as a self-enforcing 676 
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safeguard, the presence of trust is based on mutual commitment and shared values among 677 
contracting partners and it is a more effective and less costly alternative to creating a contract 678 
(Dyer and Singh 1998).  679 
Another plausible explanation for the greater role of trust is that many studies endorse the 680 
importance of guanxi (literally, interpersonal relationships or connections) in the context of 681 
China. Interpersonal guanxi helps determine whether firms gain influence in exchanging 682 
relationships (Zhuang et al. 2008). In Chinese culture, trust is based on a high level of guanxi, 683 
which is the lifeblood of business-making. Guanxi is utilitarian in developing a friendship that 684 
consists of personal ties or social bonds to share resources in business communities and is 685 
described as the informal connection essential to gain approval for or access to key resources 686 
in China (Wu et al. 2017a). Therefore, we argue that the nature of megaprojects and Chinese 687 
culture make trust more important than contracts to build relational behavior.  688 
In addition, the results indicate that institutional support can predict relational behavior 689 
(H4). This, in part, supports the work of Zhai (2017) in which institutional support could 690 
significantly influence the coordination in megaprojects. Megaprojects need specific 691 
governance regimes that can adapt to their societal contexts for efficient supervision and 692 
coordination. The administration not only imposes influences through legislation, but also 693 
proactively exercises its power on various organizations through its regulatory or administrative 694 
control so as to support the smooth implementation of megaprojects. Thus, megaproject 695 
participants are more willing to conduct information sharing, behavioral flexibility and 696 
solidarity with the intention to develop a political network with the government. A supportive 697 
political network might bring participating organizations favorable policy and scarce resources, 698 
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such as subsidies and tax breaks, and win future business opportunities in tendering other 699 
governmental-invested projects. 700 
The Effect of Contractual Term Specificity and Contingency Adaptability on Relational 701 
Behavior 702 
The role of the contract is divided into two aspects in megaprojects. In one way, the result 703 
shows that more specific contractual terms promote better relational behavior of megaproject 704 
participants. This finding is consistent with Goo et al. (2009) who provided evidence in favor 705 
of using a well-structured agreement in an IT outsourcing engagement. Due to the self-706 
enforcing nature of relational behavior, participating organizations have to rely much more on 707 
contractual term specificity to constrain their partners because they are not familiar with each 708 
other in the early stage (Luo 2002). A well-structured agreement would supply megaproject 709 
engagements with a “safety net” in lieu of exclusive reliance on trust. Thus, specified contracts 710 
are regarded as the basis to initiate megaprojects.  711 
From another respective, however, our result did not support the significant effect of 712 
contractual contingency adaptability on relational behavior. This seems to contradict to the 713 
finding of Lui (2009) where the relationship between contingency adaptability and relational 714 
performance is significant. One plausible explanation is that unlike normal-sized projects that 715 
can be easily planned, it is hard to predict all the contingencies in a megaproject due to highly 716 
interdependent works and lack of experience on similar megaprojects (Tanriverdi et al. 2007). 717 
In addition, when contingencies occur and lead to changes in the formal contract, it is preferred 718 
to be negotiated in a continuously interactive environment, whereas mutual adjustment and 719 
reciprocal on contract changes can be more effective, rather than in an environment where 720 
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contract changes settled by a standardized approach or by any specified plans, procedures, and 721 
schedules prescribed in a megaproject contract.  722 
In addition, the findings provide an in-depth understanding about the relationship between 723 
the two types of contractual mechanisms and trust by showing that contractual term 724 
specification has a significant complementary relationship with trust to enhance the relational 725 
behavior of megaproject participants. This is because explicit clauses that help develop social 726 
elements in relational exchanges include a higher level of trust that is usually associated with 727 
hierarchies (Stinchcombe and Heimer 1985). Yang et al. (2011) also emphasized that a 728 
specified contract combined with trust significantly reinforces the long-term orientation. Thus, 729 
this research provides strong evidence that specified formal contracts can be utilized to develop 730 
both trust and relational behavior. However, contractual contingency adaptability was found to 731 
be neither substitutes nor complements with trust.  732 
Another difference between these two roles of the contract is that the effect of contractual 733 
term specificity on relational behavior is weakened by uncertainty. This is consistent with 734 
previous studies that argued that formal controls may not be suitable in high uncertainty and 735 
equivocality projects because they impose constraints on the professionals involved and limit 736 
their freedom and innovation capacity (Hope and Fraser 2003). Moreover, a high level of 737 
technology and environmental uncertainty makes it difficult to pin down the terms and clauses, 738 
thus weakening the safeguard effect of contractual term specificity.  739 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 740 
The findings of the current study clarify the research and offer three effective implications 741 
for both project participants and policy makers seeking to promote the adoption of relational 742 
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behavior in megaprojects through appropriate governance mechanisms. 743 
First, participating organizations need to develop a well-structured contract between 744 
contracting parties at the outset with a high proportion of clauses representing contractual term 745 
specificity and with a medium proportion reflecting contractual contingency adaptability. A 746 
lack of term specificity leads to erroneous conclusions pertaining to the contract’s value in 747 
interacting with trust and promoting relational behavior. Therefore, each party’s rights and 748 
obligations should be detailed in writing and unambiguously specified to safeguard exchange 749 
hazards with the intention to promote relational behavior. In terms of contractual contingency 750 
adaptability, the parties concerned should not have excessive processes and methods for various 751 
contingencies and contract changes prescribed in the megaproject contract. Such complex 752 
clauses highlighting contingency adaptability will increase transaction cost but add no 753 
significant value to relationship management. When confronting different scales of 754 
megaprojects, project managers should adjust both contractual term specificity and contractual 755 
contingency adaptability according to the level of project uncertainty. For a high degree of 756 
megaproject uncertainty, managers can relatively increase the degree of contingency 757 
adaptability, such as to set an emergency response clause for quick and efficient onsite decision, 758 
as well as decrease the focus on term specificity for promoting the implementation of relational 759 
behavior. Comparatively, more term specificity and less contingency adaptability should be set 760 
for a megaproject with certain scope and standard, so parties can exhibit their behavior in a 761 
more regulated manner.  762 
Second, megaproject participants must attach both the importance of trust and contractual 763 
term specificity because they are mutually complementary to enhance relational behavior. 764 
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Cultivating mutual trust of megaproject participants cannot be ignored while spending efforts 765 
in drafting contracts with their business partners. Trust-building tools, such as relationship 766 
workshops, are encouraged to be used in megaprojects so as to facilitate open communication, 767 
build relationships, achieve mutual understanding, and to generate innovative programs that 768 
promote coordination (Chen and Manley 2014). For instance, a trust-bond activity can be 769 
arranged to precede or accompany the contract negotiation process so as to obtain the mutual 770 
trust. Then both parties are more engaged and efficient to straightforwardly focus on reviewing 771 
contractual terms rather than wasting time on suspicious doubts, so negotiation time and efforts 772 
can be saved. Through the reciprocal process of fulfilling one contractual term and entering 773 
another, the mutual trust is further enhanced to cultivate the friendly environment not only 774 
benefiting the contract negotiation but also creating the harmonized relationship between both 775 
parties.  776 
Third, government officials should endeavor to support the implementation of 777 
megaprojects in transition economies like China, where successful megaproject management 778 
often leverages the government’s power to exert its influence on coordination and control. For 779 
example, megaprojects adopt a special leadership committee to integrate all project participants 780 
to provide vision, governance, and leadership (Chen and Manley 2014), and the officials of 781 
Chinese central and local governments are typically delegated as major leaders in providing 782 
strong support for the megaprojects, and, thereby, promote project participants’ solidarity, 783 
flexibility, and information sharing. Further, enhancing relational behavior within a 784 
megaproject, project participants are expected to build social capital with the government to 785 
win benefits in the long-run.  786 
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CONCLUSIONS 787 
High levels of relational behavior between project participating organizations are vital for 788 
the success of relationship management in megaprojects. Focusing on the governance 789 
perspective, this study developed a theoretical model showing the relationships between 790 
contract, trust, and institutional support, and the association between relational behavior and 791 
team performance. Then, a sample of 202 managers of consultants and contractors in Chinese 792 
megaprojects were collected and analyzed by hierarchical moderated regression analyses.  793 
Three main findings were discussed. First, three subcategories of governance 794 
mechanisms—contractual term specificity, trust, and institutional support—are all significant 795 
in improving relational behavior and among them, trust is most effective, indicating that 796 
informal mechanisms like trust are relatively better facilitators of relational behavior than 797 
formal mechanisms, such as contract. Second, regarding the interaction of contract and trust on 798 
relational behavior, it is confirmed that contractual term specificity and trust are complements 799 
rather than substitutes, while contractual term specificity and trust are neither pure 800 
complements nor substitutes. Third, the moderating effect of project uncertainty was 801 
particularly important, exhibiting mixed effects—positively moderating both the relationships 802 
between trust and relational behavior, and between contractual contingency adaptability and 803 
relational behavior—yet negatively moderating the relationship between contractual term 804 
specificity and relational behavior. The findings of the present study offer three key insights for 805 
stakeholders seeking to use appropriate governance mechanisms to promote the adoption of 806 
relational behavior in megaprojects, namely developing a well-structured contract for 807 
megaproject implementation, attaching importance of both trust and contractual term 808 
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specificity, and calling for more institutional support for megaproject relationship management. 809 
This paper contributes to the theory of megaprojects inter-organizational relationship in 810 
three aspects. First, the study contextualizes multiple theories in megaprojects to examine the 811 
characterization of relational behavior and identifies three key paths influencing relational 812 
behavior via reinforcing contractual governance, increasing mutual trust, and offering 813 
institutional support. These paths switch on or off depending on the megaproject uncertainty. 814 
As the three paths reveal different aspects of project governance, understanding their roles is 815 
significant to improve relationship management in megaprojects. 816 
Second, the current study provides new insights into contractual governance theory by 817 
expanding the boundary of studying contractual governance as a unidimensional construct. This 818 
study examines two differential roles―both term specificity and contingency adaptability, in 819 
facilitating relational behavior among megaproject participants. The results imply that 820 
contractual term specificity intensifies inter-organizational relational behavior, whereas the 821 
effect of contractual contingency adaptability is not significant. Besides, it is also confirmed 822 
that term specificity and trust are mutually complemented in megaprojects, contributing to the 823 
long-standing debate on the topic of “substitutes versus complements” for the relationship 824 
between contractual governance and relational governance. 825 
Last, this study demonstrates the facilitating role of the government through its 826 
institutional support for relational behavior in megaprojects. Previous studies normally assume 827 
full enforcement of contractual mechanism and relational mechanisms on inter-organizational 828 
relationships but ignore the role of the government under different institutional environments, 829 
especially in transition economies. Researchers have called for more assessments of the 830 
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institutional support provided to megaproject development (Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002), 831 
though empirical evidence is still scarce. This study presents an initial attempt to assess and 832 
confirm that the institutional support has profound effects on strengthening the inter-833 
organizational relationship among megaproject participants.  834 
Despite these theoretical contributions mentioned above, the interpretation of the 835 
findings should be made carefully due to three limitations that must be addressed in future 836 
endeavors. The first limitation is the use of a one-time survey of megaproject participants while 837 
ignoring the dynamic process of relational behavior that changes over time, during which 838 
participating organizations may adjust their governance strategies and collaborative decisions. 839 
Besides, a self-reporting survey was employed to collect behavior information from one 840 
contracting party, which is inevitably subject to the bias perceived by one side. Future research 841 
could take a longitudinal perspective to examine how governance mechanisms and relational 842 
behavior evolve and change over time, and consider to gather matched-dyad data from paired 843 
informants, such as collecting information from both clients and contractors in the same 844 
megaproject. 845 
The second limitation is that the study mainly considers the interaction between 846 
contractual mechanisms and trust, without considering other moderating effects (i.e., project 847 
uncertainty and institutional support). Further studies are recommended to extend the 848 
inclusiveness of the governance model that incorporate more interaction effects and potential 849 
moderators in megaprojects. The third limitation is that the empirical data in this study were all 850 
collected from megaprojects in China, so the application of the findings to other countries 851 
should be performed with caution and appropriate adjustments. For instance, China's culture of 852 
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guanxi fosters the popularization of network-centered rather than market-centered strategies in 853 
business operations (Peng 2003). In contrast, in most developed countries, the contract is a 854 
more effective governance mechanism for promoting inter-organizational exchange. A wider 855 
scope of data collection across different countries and regions could provide valuable 856 
information that would expand the generalization of the research results. 857 
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TABLE 1. Illustrations of main dimensions of key literature on governance mechanisms  
Type of formal governance 
mechanism 
Type of informal governance 
mechanism 
Key literature 
 Ex ante contracts  
 Ex post control 
 Trust Zhang and Zhou (2013) 
 Formal contract  Relational norms,  
 Trust 
Arranz and Arroyabe 
(2012) 
 Explicit contracts 
 Relationship-specific 
investments 
 Social norms 
 Trust 
Burkert et al. (2012) 
 Contracts  Trust Chen et al. (2013) 
 Structural mechanisms 
(contracts)  
 Administrative mechanism 
(effective allocation and 
demarcation of responsibilities) 
 Relational mechanism 
(collaboration and information 
sharing) 
Jayaraman et al. (2013) 
 Contract  Trust Malhotra and 
Lumineau (2011) 
 Contractual safeguards  Trustworthiness Schilke and Cook 
(2015) 
 Contract   Trust Jiang et al. (2013) 
 Formal control   Social control Jin et al. (2014) 
 Administrative control, through 
explicit contractual agreements; 
a dominant power position 
 A dominant power position 
 Social/relational control 
Caniëls and Gelderman 
(2010) 
 Incentives, 
 Authority  
 Trust 
Olsen et al. (2005) 
 Contract 
 Power 
 Trust 
Wang et al. (2008) 
 Formal contracts  Brokered access,  
 Shared goals,  
 Trust 
Li et al. (2010) 
None 
 
 Relational governance 
(institutional support from the 
government) 
Chi and Javernick‐
Will (2011) 
None 
 
 Governmental governance 
(institutional support from the 
government) 
Zhai (2017) 
 
TABLE 2. Measurements of constructs 
Constructs  Description of measurement items  Key sources 
Contractual term 
specificity (TS) 
TS1 — Governed by written contracts 
primarily;  
TS2 — Detailed obligations and rights;  
TS3 — Detailed rewards and punishments. 
Fryxell et al. 
(2002); 
Jap and Ganesan 
(2000) 
Contractual 
contingency 
adaptability (CA) 
CA1 — Detailed approaches for unexpected 
situations; 
CA2 — Detailed approaches for conflicts. 
Goo et al. (2009); 
Luo (2002) 
Trust (TR) 
 
TR1 — Trustworthy of other participants;  
TR2 — Ability of other participants to perform 
tasks;  
TR3 — Keeping promises; 
TR4 — Good reputation of other participants; 
Lu et al. (2015) 
 TR5 — Believing provided information of other 
participants.  
 
Institutional 
support (IS) 
IS1 — Building harmonious relationship among 
multiple stakeholders by the government; 
IS2 — Implementing policies and programs by 
the government. 
Li and Atuahene-
Gima (2001) 
Relational 
behavior (RB) 
  
 
 
1) Solidarity (RBS) 
RBS1 — Addressing problems jointly;  
RBS2 — Helping others;  
RBS3 — Committing to improving project 
relationship. 
2) Flexibility (RBF)   
RBF1 — Flexible to changes;  
RBF2 — Flexible to conflicts. 
3) Information sharing (RBI)  
RBI1 — Providing proprietary information;  
RBI2 — Updating information to other 
participants;  
RBI3 — Providing information frequently. 
Hoppner and 
Griffith (2011) 
Team performance 
(TP) 
   
TP1 — Satisfied with the time performance;  
TP2 — Satisfied with the quality performance;  
TP3 — Satisfied with the cost performance;  
TP4 — Building long-term partnership;  
TP5 — Collaborating joint projects in the 
future. 
Lu et al. (2015) 
Project uncertainty 
(PU) 
 
PU1 — Environmental uncertainty;  
PU2 — Task uncertainty;  
PU3 — Technological innovation. 
Yan and Dooley 
(2013) 
 
 
TABLE 3. Demographics of surveyed projects and respondents 
Variable Category Number Percentage 
Types of respondent 
firms 
Designer 106 52.48% 
 Contractor 96 47.52% 
Positions of 
respondents 
Project directors 36 17.82% 
 Project/team 
managers 
77 38.12% 
 Department/operation 
managers 
89 44.06% 
Project type Transportation hub 99 49.01% 
 Road 12 5.94% 
 Bridge 10 4.95% 
 Tunnel 9 4.46% 
 Railway 6 2.97% 
 Highway 2 0.99% 
 Airport 13 6.44% 
 Skyscraper 11 5.45% 
 Dam 32 15.84% 
 Public building (such 
as event facilities) 
8 3.96% 
Project location North China 11 5.45% 
 Northeast China 1 0.50% 
 East China 98 48.51% 
 South Central China 72 35.64% 
 Southwest China 17 8.42% 
 Northwest China 3 1.49% 
TABLE 4. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Contractual term 
specificity 
1          
2. Contractual 
contingency 
adaptability 
0.70** 1         
3. Trust 0.49** 0.48** 1        
4. Institutional support 0.30** 0.17* 0.23** 1       
5. Relational behavior 0.45** 0.35** 0.48** 0.35** 1      
6. Project uncertainty 0.15* 0.10 0.31** 0.14 0.16* 1     
7. Team performance 0.27** 0.22** 0.35** 0.27** 0.57** -0.06 1    
8. Project duration 0.01 -0.00 0.21** -0.08 0.06 -0.01 0.11 1   
9. Project delivery 
method 
0.14* 0.06 0.00 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.15* -0.05 1  
10. Prior collaborative 
experience 
0.11 0.06 0.03 0.17* 0.06 0.03 0.15* 0.18* 0.10 1 
Mean 4.04  3.78  3.91  4.16  3.83  3.55  3.87  1.53  1.29  0.71  
Standard 
Deviation(S.D.) 
0.53  0.68  0.52  0.57  0.36  0.64  0.42  0.50  0.79  0.45  
Note: Sample size =202. 
*Significance at p < 0.05 level.  
**Significance at p < 0.01 level. 
 
  
TABLE 5. Factor loading of each items, AVE and CR of each construct 
Construct/item Loading t-value AVE CR 
Contractual term  
specificity (TS) 
  0.66  0.85  
TS1 0.84 27.71   
TS2 0.84 27.70   
TS3 0.74 14.87   
Contractual contingency 
adaptability (CA) 
  0.84  0.91  
CA1 0.94 63.46   
CA2 0.89 30.62   
Trust (TR)   0.53  0.85  
TR1 0.69 13.34   
TR2 0.71 16.17   
TR3 0.76 20.84   
TR4 0.66 12.19   
TR5 0.82 32.46   
Institutional support (IS)   0.71  0.83  
IS1 0.88 20.11   
IS2 0.80 12.31   
Solidarity (RBS)   0.65  0.85  
RBS1 0.85 35.60   
RBS2 0.71 15.05   
RBS3 0.85 42.29   
Flexibility (RBF)   0.86  0.92  
RBF1 0.92 67.04   
RBF2 0.93 96.60   
Information exchange 
(RBI) 
  0.66  0.85  
RBI1 0.76 19.87   
RBI2 0.87 43.34   
RBI3 0.81 23.68   
Team performance (TP)   0.61  0.88  
TP1 0.84 35.07   
TP2 0.78 25.40   
TP3 0.73 21.78   
TP4 0.79 24.93   
TP5 0.75 20.48   
  
Construct/item Loading t-value AVE CR 
Project Uncertainty (PU)   0.60  0.82  
PU1 0.68 3.10   
PU2 0.85 4.58   
PU3 0.78 4.12   
Note: CR = composite reliability; AVE = average variance extracted. 
  
TABLE 6. Standardized regression results a 
 
Model 1 b Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 β β β β 
Control variables     
Project duration 0.05  0.00  0.01  
Project delivery method -0.05  -0.09  -0.09   
Prior collaborative experience 0.06  -0.01  -0.01   
Independent variables     
Contractual term specificity (X1)  0.25** 0.23**  
Contractual contingency adaptability (X2)  -0.01  -0.01   
Trust (X3)  0.31*** 0.29***  
Institutional support (X4)  0.20*** 0.19***  
Relational behavior    0.57*** 
Moderating variable     
Project uncertainty (X5)  -0.01  0.04   
Interaction terms     
X1*X3   0.19*  
X2*X3   -0.09   
X1*X5   -0.35***    
X2*X5   0.18+  
X3*X5   0.13+   
R² 0.01  0.33  0.38  0.32 
F-value 0.57  11.95*** 8.99*** 93.54*** 
∆R²  0.32***  0.05**   
Note: N = 202 
***p < 0.001; 
**p < 0.01;  
*p < 0.05;  
+p < 0.1 (two-tailed). 
a The entries in the Table are standardized path coefficients.  
b The dependent variable of Model 1 to Model 3 is relational behavior while the dependent variable of Model 4 is 
team performance. 
 
 
  
 
 Fig.1. Concept model of the effect of governance mechanisms on relational behavior. 
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Fig.2. Moderating effects of project uncertainty on the relationship (a) between contractual term specificity 
and relational behavior; (b) between contractual contingency adaptability and relational behavior; (c) 
between trust and relational behavior. 
Notes：Low and high project uncertainty are equivalent to one standard deviation below and above the means of project uncertainty. 
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